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of Well-being Dissected 
Robert Summers and Alan Heston 
This paper will attempt to illuminate the condition of  well-being of the 5.5 
billion people on earth. More what questions will be addressed here than why 
questions, but, until we know more than we do, there is plenty of room for a 
division of  labor in dispelling darkness. The arithmetic that follows, in the 
form of tables and graphs, means and Gini coefficients, frequency distributions 
and Lorenz curves, etc., is the easy part. Determining which numbers are the 
relevant ones for the arithmetic is the hard part. Illumination is our modest ob- 
jective.’ 
The primary data available for what follows, of  greater or less quality, are 
time series of  real gross domestic product (GDP) and its major components 
for nearly all the countries of the world.* These come from an update of  the 
Penn World Table  (PWT), last described in  Summers and Heston (1991), 
Robert Summers is professor of economics at the University of Pennsylvania. Alan Heston is 
professor of economics and South Asia studies at the University of Pennsylvania. 
The research reported here was supported by  the National  Science Foundation  under grant 
SBR93-21471. Discussions with Klaus Deininger, Maurine Cropper, Alan Kelley, Sam Preston, 
and Kip Viscusi were all very helpful. Mark McMullen and Taisir  Anbar Colas provided invaluable 
research assistance. 
1. The world income distribution has been the subject of too many investigations to provide 
all the relevant citations here. Suffice it to say, the earliest study consulted here that attempted 
systematically to estimate the parameters of the world distribution in the spirit of the present work 
was Andic and Peacock (1961), where country GDPs were made comparable using exchange rates. 
Another study using an economic indicators approach was Beckerman and Bacon (1970). Earlier 
efforts by the present authors were Summers, Kravis, and Heston (1981, 1984). 
2. The objections of some distinguished, knowledgeable economists to the use of national ac- 
counts data to measure welfare should at least be noted before the objections are ignored (see, 
e.g.,  Okun 1971). The well-known disparities between the utility-generating effects of a country’s 
activities and the imperfect valuation of them using market data and relatively few imputations 
are indeed problems. With one exception, in the work described below we do not follow another 
trend among some economists to “correct” the deficiencies in the national accounts (see, e.g., 
Nordhaus and Tobin 1972; and Eisner 1988). 
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which in turn is based on the work of the International Comparison Program 
(ICP).3 Unlike the values of the GDPs and components of the system of na- 
tional accounts (SNA), all the country numbers are expressed in a common 
currency unit, based on a set of average world prices of a particular year, so 
they are directly comparable across countries and time. Since time series of 
country populations are also available, describing world well-being would ap- 
pear to be a very simple matter, at least at a very primitive level. The introduc- 
tory economics way of handling these numbers for any particular year would 
be to divide each country’s GDP by its population to get the country’s GDP per 
capita (GDPF). (Never mind yet exactly what the meaning of this number is.) 
Then the mean and, say, the standard deviation of  the collection of  GDP,’s 
would be calculated and somehow interpreted. (For example, is the mean in- 
creasing fast enough? Is the standard deviation too big-or  too small-and 
how is it changing over time?) Of  course, when the persons engaged in this 
exercise get to intermediate economics, they will learn more  sophisticated 
ways of getting at inequality than the standard deviation, and they will be re- 
minded that they have not taken account of differences in income of  people 
within countries. And, it may be hoped, there will be a clarification of  what 
exactly GDP,  is a measure of. This paper will go through these introductory 
and intermediate economics exercises on data covering almost a half century, 
clarifying what is being measured and what might be better measured. In an 
effort to improve on the usual GDP approach, some additional country vari- 
ables involving age composition, particular subaggregates of national output, 
and quintile expenditures will be introduced. 
Section 16.1 sharpens the concept well-being. First, the distinctions between 
material well-being and other kinds are considered. For concreteness, some 
thoughts are advanced about a broadened measure of well-being that encom- 
passes both material well-being and longevity. (Please note: this does not augur 
an imminent entry into the still small cottage industry of  researchers devel- 
oping  social welfare indexes that  embrace material and  sociological-cum- 
political-cum-demographic-cum-etc.  well-being.) An effort is made then to il- 
luminate-there  is that word again-the  overused concept per capita and sug- 
gest an alternative. Finally, two versions of the concept current material well- 
being are discussed that are designed to get at comparisons of  present stan- 
dards of  living. 
Sections 16.2-16.4  contain the empirical findings derived from the PWT 
international data set for the concepts in section 16.1. The concluding section, 
section 16.5, summarizes the empirical findings. 
3. References to the voluminous ICP work can be found in Summers and Heston (1991). The 
data underlying the present work come from the Penn World Table (Mark 5.6).  a large space-time 
system of national accounts that has been under development since 1980, when the Mark 1 version 
appeared in Summers, Kravis, and Heston (1980). (Mark 5.6 is an update of the Mark 5 version 
described in Summers and Heston [1991].) 481  The World Distribution of Well-being Dissected 
16.1  The Concept of Well-being 
16.1.1  What Should Enter an Empirical Social Welfare Function? 
How many arguments should one consider in thinking about a social welfare 
function (SWF) for a country? Although there are at least a couple of dozen 
candidates in the data volumes of the World Bank and other international or- 
ganizations, most economists are glad to restrict their attention to their own 
bread and butter, namely, material well-being. They may  use various social 
indicators to help explain differences in countries’ material well-being, or they 
may investigate how the social indicators are affected by material well-being. 
It is only the venturesome who attempt, so far with extremely limited success, 
to incorporate nonmaterial and material dimensions of  well-being in a single 
empirical indicator. 
If  there is agreement that a particular social indicator does measure some- 
thing that contributes to countries’ well-being, why should it not be included 
in the social welfare function? It should be if one can figure out how it should 
be fitted in. The problem is that rarely (if ever) can one find an acceptable 
“scientific” basis for combining the social indicator with the material well-be- 
ing measure that economists are ready to embrace. Economists have no trouble 
coping with a multiple-argument social welfare function when they have a ba- 
sis for weighting the utilities generated by each of the entries. Shoelaces and 
Chevrolets are easy to combine if a price of each is available that reflects the 
relative utilities flowing from a unit of each. But where does one find the appro- 
priate “prices” for such social indicators as, say, political freedom or literacy 
or an extra year of life? In section 16.4, a pricing notion for the value of  an 
extra year of life will be explored with a view to taking a baby step toward a 




The directly preceding discussion raises the question-without  answering 
it !-of  including more than just material well-being in assessing the overall 
welfare of countries. Here, and immediately below, however, the focus is on 
the simpler problem of judging material well-being alone. The conventional 
measure is GDP,.4  Obviously, GDP by  itself cannot be the measure. India’s 
GDP is far greater than Ireland’s, but no one would for a moment think that 
Material Well-being: Numerators Looking for Denominators 
4.  Strictly speaking, gross national product (GNP) is more appropriate than GDP. In some indi- 
vidual cases, Luxembourg particularly, the distinction may be important, but estimated distribu- 
tions are not likely to be sensitive to the difference. Only GDP is considered in this paper. 482  Robert Summers and Alan Heston 
was conclusive. GDP measures the quantity of goods and services available to 
meet a country’s needs but is silent on the magnitude of those needs. Dividing 
GDP by  the number of  mouths to be fed adjusts for need; this is a way  of 
rationalizing the use of the per capita concept. But what if  some mouths are 
bigger than others (perhaps stomach size would be a more apt metaphor) and 
the proportion of little mouths is greater in some countries and less in others? 
(Remember these stylized facts: in developed countries, 20 percent of the pop- 
ulation is under fifteen years of  age, while, in developing countries-China 
apart at 25 percent-the  percentage is more like 40.) Should one worry about 
taking account of these demographic differences across co~ntries?~  The view 
here is, “Let’s try.” The reader will be able to judge from the presentation in 
section 16.2 whether the present attempt is helpful and, more specifically, 
whether it makes a difference. 
Numerators 
GDP is a very useful multipurpose measure of  the quantity of goods and 
services available to a country, but it is not an all-purpose measure. Its breadth 
is attractive to development economists concerned with the level and change 
of a country’s “stage of development.” However, some questions call for a mea- 
sure of a country’s standard of living, which in the end is what motivates pro- 
ductive activity. To put it in a suggestive way, consider an alternative concept, 
SL, that is concerned with current material well-being. This now emphasis still 
allows the use of the real national accounts database, but one must be selective 
in extracting elements from the ICP national accounts tableau. One should 
leave out the goods relating to the future and omit any part of GDP that does 
not directly contribute to material well-being. The first part is easy: simply 
leave out investment (including net foreign investment) and include only total 
consumption, private and public. The second part is more problematic: exclude 
any regrettable necessities that  are measurable and  that  most  people  will 
agree on.6 
The presentation in section 16.3 will focus primarily on SL. (Unfortunately, 
in the latest PWT, SL is available only for the years 1970-89.) Following this, 
a supplemental standard-of-living measure will be presented for a distinctly 
limited number of countries and years. This alternative, SL,,  melds some in- 
come distribution information with (private) consumption to show the per cap- 
ita consumption of  the middle quintile of the population for each available 
data point. Very loosely speaking, this may be thought of as an estimate of an 
expanded version of a country’s median private spending. 
5. Beware of  stepping off  onto slippery  slopes! Are the material needs of  people in a cold 
climate not greater than the needs of  those in a temperate climate? How about taking account of 
rugged vs. gentle terrains? And so on. 
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16.2  The GDP Facts 
16.2.1  Levels 
GDP and GDP per Capita 
Graphs of both world income, the sum of the GDPs of all the countries of 
the world, and world income per capita are presented for the years 1960-90 
in figures 16.1 and 16.2. (A log scale is used on the vertical axes to facilitate 
growth rate comparisons at different times.) Also, the world is subdivided into 
groups of countries at three income stages: forty-five low-income countries; 
sixty-five middle-income countries, further subdivided into fifty-one nonoil 
countries and fourteen oil; and twenty-four industrialized countries.'  Graphs 
depicting the income experiences of the four groups of countries also appear 
in figures 16.1 and 16.2. 
The assignments are based on the World Bank's current classification sys- 
tem rather than an equivalent first-period 1960 classification system. This was 
to make the findings consistent with other research findings of  the Bank. Of 
course, this grouping by late-period status presents problems for convergence 
analysis because the fastest-growing countries among the low- and middle- 
income countries in 1960 will have graduated to higher status by  1990, with 
the effect of understating the growth rate of the group of low-income countries 
and overstating the growth rate of  the group of high-income countries. (If an 
Asian Tiger in the bottom category in 1960 reached the top category by 1990, 
its high rate of growth would have been credited to the top category under the 
Bank's system, even though it should have been credited to the bottom cate- 
gory.) Note, however, that using the late-period assignments means that, if we 
conclude on the basis of our empirical observation that low-income countries 
have improved their condition between 1960 and 1990, we can be really sure of 
it because we have not counted the growth of the star performers of the group. 
The simplest questions answered by the graphs are, Is the world going uphill 
or downhill with respect to increasing its output and increasing its output faster 
than its needs have increased? The positive slopes of the world time series in 
both figure 16.1 and figure 16.2 indicate that the answers are uphill and uphill. 
Do the rich get richer and the poor get poorer? No, the positive slopes of both 
the GDP and the GDP,  graphs of the industrialized and low indicate that the 
rich and the poor are both getting richer. Do the rich get richer faster than 
the poor get richer? The naked eye is not good at comparing the slopes of the 
industrialized and low graphs over a long period, but the latter slope appears 
smaller in the early years and greater in the later years. Table 16.3 below, to be 
discussed shortly, contains the growth rates that will make the comparisons 
7. For the specific country assignments, see the appendix. The World Bank Atlas (1995) lists an 
additional 75 countries and temtories, all very small, beyond the 134 covered here that account 
for all but 3 percent of the world's  1990 population. The Penn World Table (Mark 5.6) contains 
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Fig. 16.1  Real GDP: world and by income group, 1960-90 
clear. (Another dynamic question, apparently frivolous but not at all without 
content, is, Do the rich get richer and the poor get children? Rather than com- 
pare income-group slopes between fig. 16.1 and fig. 16.2, this question will 
also be reserved for the discussion of table 16.3.) First, however, How much 
richer are the rich than the poor? The entries in table 16.1 show this striking 
stylized fact in  1990: the poor (the lows) had just over half the population of 
the world but received only a sixth of  the world's  output, while the rich (the 
industrialized)  had about a sixth of the population and got about half the out- 
put. Leading up to 1990, the rich share of world output went down between 
1960 and 1990; the poor share stayed virtually the same; and the middles got 
what the rich lost. (More of that comes out in examining the growth rates of 
table 16.3.) 
Table 16.2 is provided to show whether the message of table 16.1 is really 
dominated by the factss about the most populous country in the world, China. 
It turns out that excluding China from the calculations in table 16.1 does not 
8. Facts is not an apt word for describing the real national accounts of  China. The hard facts 
that go behind the soft estimates so far available, which it is hoped will become available soon, 
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Fig. 16.2  Real GDP per capita: world and by income group, 1960-90 
alter the pattern of  change much. The low population is much  smaller, of 
course, and the populations of the other groups are now a larger proportion of 
the world total. This affects the magnitude of change of the aggregate outputs 
of the groups, but it does not change the basic conclusion. The shares of  the 
rich and middle are greater, and the poor’s  share is lower, but the changes in 
the shares between 1960 and 1990 are roughly the same as when China is in- 
cluded. 
GDP and GDP per Equivalent Adult 
Table 16.1 has been used so far to comment on countries’ capacities to meet 
their per capita needs. Are the poor really as bad off relative to the rich if need 
is defined in a way that better takes account of countries’ demographics? To 
say the least, it is hard to find proper equivalent-adult scales across 134 coun- 
tries that value the relative consumption needs of persons in different demo- 
graphic categories, but the equivalent adult (EA) entries of table 16.1 are meant 
to help put the big moutMittle mouth consideration in per~pective.~  How dif- 
9. In  the light of the well-known significant increasing returns from consumption  of families of 
different sizes, demographic considerations are better taken into account by  working with house- 486  Robert Summers and Alan Heston 
Table 16.1  Real Shares of World Output: GDP 1960,1970,1980,1990 
Middle 
Low  Oil  Nonoil  Total  Industrial 
No. of countries 
I960 
% of population 
% of equivalent adults 
% of GDP 
I970 
% of population 
% of equivalent adults 
% of GDP 
I980 
% of population 
% of equivalent adults 
% of GDP 
I990 
% of population 
% of equivalent adults 


































































ferent are the needs of the income groups when they are defined in terms of 
equivalent adults, albeit very crudely scaled? The proportion of  the world's 
total number of equivalent adults located in each income group is given for the 
not-implausible case of the EA value for children under fifteen years being set 
at 0.5 and that for everyone else at 1.0. Table 16.1's slightly surprising story is 
that judgments about the difference in well-being between the rich and the 
poor are only slightly affected by equivalent adult considerations.'O 
16.2.2  Growth 
Table 16.3 lays out the growth patterns of GDP, GDP,,,  and GDP per equiva- 
lent adult over the three decades 1960-90."  (Table 16.4, analogous to table 
hold size data for different countries as well as age composition. Data limitations across 124 coun- 
tries make it impossible to follow the much more satisfactory equivalent adult procedures de- 
scribed in Burckhauser, Smeeding, and Merz (1996). Our early minor effort in this direction 
foundered because  sufficiently detailed data on household size was available for only a small 
number of developed countries. 
10. Furthermore,  the equivalent adult story remains essentially the same when EA is set at either 
0.4 or 0.6. Unless one wants to make the case that EA is smaller than 0.4 or that it is smaller for 
the poor than for the rich, the only defensible conclusion remains that per capita and per equivalent 
adult considerations tell essentially the same story. 
11. The reader is reminded of a point made earlier. The country assignments are based on 1990 
GDP per capita. This means that fast-growing Japan, Hong Kong, and Singapore are included in 
the industrialized group, although in 1960 they would not have been. If the classification had been 
based on 1960 incomes, the average industrialized growth rate would have been lower. 487  The World Distribution of Well-being Dissected 
Table 16.2  Real Shares of World Output: GDP, Excluding China, 1960,1970, 
1980,1990 
Middle 
Low  Oil  Nonoil  Total  Industrial 
No. of  countries 
I960 
% of population 
% of  equivalent adults 
% of GDP 
1970 
% of population 
% of equivalent adults 
% of GDP 
I980 
% of population 
% of equivalent adults 
% of GDP 
I990 
% of population 
% of equivalent adults 
% of  GDP 





























































16.2 in its exclusion of China, is provided without comment, just for complete- 
ness.) Now  the focus is on the growth differences among the three income 
groups. Note that world growth in GDP slowed down over the decades, from 
5.2 to 4.0 to 3.1 percent. Both the industrialized and the middle growth rates 
went down (from 5.1 to 3.1 to 2.8 percent in the first case and from 6.4 to 5.6 
to 2.6 percent in the other). However, the growth rate of  low went the other 
way,  from 3.9 to 4.4 to 5.0 percent. Over the thirty years, not only was the 
poor’s output increasing, but it was increasing at a faster rate than the rich’s- 
4.4 versus 3.6 percent! (The middle growth rate went down more sharply than 
the rich, but its average was still higher.) So much for output, but what about 
need? Over the thirty years, the low’s GDP went up faster than the industrial- 
ized’s-but  its population growth was  much greater. Its GDP,  growth fell 
short of that of the industrialized group, 2.1 against 2.6 percent. 
The overall conclusions about the condition of countries around the world 
over the last thirty-odd years, in question-and-answer form, are as follows: 
(i) Has the output of the rich gone up while the output of the poor gone down? 
Not at all. (ii) Have the rich gotten rich faster than the poor? Not in  terms 
of  output, but, if  need is adequately measured by  population size, then yes. 
(iii) Have the rich gotten richer and the poor gotten children? Yes, but the 
output of the poor has gone up more than enough to still make them better off. 
(iv) Is the estimated gap between the rich and the poor greater if  one takes Table 16.3  Average Annual Rates of Growth (%):  GDP, GDP per Capita, GDP 
per Equivalent Adult, 1960-70,1970-80,1980-90,1960-90 
Middle 
Low  Oil  Nonoil  Total  Industrial  World 
1960-70 
GDP 
GDP per capita 
GDP per equivalent adult 
1970-80 
GDP 
GDP per capita 
GDP per equivalent adult 
1980-90 
GDP 
GDP per capita 
GDP per equivalent adult 
1960-90 
GDP 
GDP per capita 
GDP per equivalent adult 
3.9  7.2  6.2  6.4 
1.6  4.2  4.2  4.2 
1.7  4.3  4.2  4.2 
4.4  5.6  5.6  5.6 
2.2  3.2  3.8  3.7 
2.0  3.1  3.7  3.6 
5.0  .1  2.9  2.6 
2.9  -3.0  1.3  .7 
2.6  -3.0  1.3  .7 
4.4  4.2  4.9  4.8 
2.2  1.4  3.1  2.9 

























Table 16.4  Average Annual Rates of Growth, Excluding China (%):  GDP, GDP 
per Capita, GDP per Equivalent Adult, 1960-70,1970-80, 
1980-90,1960-90 
Middle 
Low  Oil  Nonoil  Total  Industrial  World 
1960-70 
GDP 
GDP per capita 
GDP per equivalent adult 
1970-80 
GDP 
GDP per capita 
GDP per equivalent adult 
1980-90 
GDP 
GDP per capita 
GDP per equivalent adult 
1960-90 
GDP 
GDP per capita 
GDP per equivalent adult 
3.7  7.2  6.2  6.4 
1.3  4.2  4.2  4.2 
1.4  4.3  4.2  4.2 
3.8  5.6  5.6  5.6 
1.3  3.2  3.8  3.7 
1.3  3.1  3.7  3.6 
5.2  .1  2.9  2.6 
2.8  -3.0  1.3  .7 
2.6  -3.0  1.3  .7 
4.3  4.2  4.9  4.8 
1.8  1.4  3.1  2.9 
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Fig. 16.3  Intercountry inequality: GDP per capita, Lorenz curves, and Gini 
coefficients, 1960,1970,1980, and 1990 
account of the differences in age composition of the two groups? Allowing for 
the smaller consumption needs of  children does not have much effect on the 
size of the gap. 
16.2.3  Inequality 
Tables 16.1-16.4  show how  groups of countries at different points of  the 
income spectrum fared over the last thirty years. In a last examination of the 
world distribution of  material well-being as measured in  GDP terms, figure 
16.3 displays world Lorenz curves for each of the decennial years under study. 
The great similarity of the curves'* is consistent with table 16.5's report of very 
12. The Lorenz curves are so similar that a single diagram depicting all four of them is difficult 
to digest. The device of displaying the diagram four times, each with the area under just one of 
the curves shaded in, helps clarify which curve is lowest where. 490  Robert Summers and Alan Heston 
Table 16.5  Intercountry Income Inequality: GDP (Gini coefficients: 1960,1970, 
1980,1990) 
Middle 
Low  Oil  Nonoil  Total  Industrial  World 
1960  ,117  .452  ,207  ,252  ,222  ,539 
1970  ,108  ,467  ,218  .268  ,141  ,558 
1980  ,097  .442  ,216  ,261  ,113  ,552 
1990  ,117  ,385  ,258  ,295  ,090  .547 
small differences between the Gini coefficients for the four years (0.539,0.558, 
0.552, and 0.547). This suggests that the four world income distributions are 
equivalent as far as inequality is concerned. However, the Lorenz curves cross. 
Close study of the curves shows what could have been gleaned from table 16.1. 
The great similarity of the Ginis means that the average difference between all 
pairs  of  observations-country  pairs in  the present case-did  not  change 
much. The fact that the low grew more slowly than the industrialized (see table 
16.3) would make one think that the average difference went up. How, then, 
could the Gini have remained practically the same? Observe in table 16.3 that 
the middle grew faster than the industrialized. This narrowed the difference 
between those groups enough to leave the overall difference more or less the 
same. The Gini did not change, so one should expect that the low was not left 
behind by  the other two groups in 1990. Indeed, it ended up with a slightly 
reduced share of total world output, relative to its greater share of the world's 
population. A detailed examination of the Lorenz curves shows that the bottom 
quintile of the world got 4.74 percent of world output in 1960 but slightly less, 
4.58 percent, in  1990. This is a 3.4 percent difference, hardly negligible for 
the most hungry part of the world's population. A comparison of the Ginis for 
the two years does not highlight this. 
Incidentally, table  16.5 provides information about changes in inequality 
within as well as across the low, middle, and industrialized groups.13  The only 
observed changes worth remarking on probably are a result of the way  coun- 
tries were assigned to income groups: they were assigned on the basis of their 
last-period rather than first-period incomes. 
16.2.4  Some Miscellaneous Facts about the World Distribution of Income 
Inequality in the World Distribution of  Utility 
The existence of diminishing marginal utility of  income is widely recog- 
nized by economists, and its implications underlie many parts of political de- 
bate. The conceptual and operational problems associated with any kind of 
13. Note that the absolute degree of  inequality in each group is of no significance because that 
is dictated by the (somewhat arbitrary) choice of cutoff points defining the groups. 491  The World Distribution of Well-being Dissected 
measurements associated with the notion of utility are so formidable that it is 
very difficult to make any kind of policy decisions that depend on “scientific” 
judgments flowing from interpersonal comparisons of utility. (The progressiv- 
ity of most income tax schedules is testimony to the widespread belief in the 
declining marginal utility, but the degree of progressivity legislated never flows 
from any scientijc evaluations of the rate of decline, particularly relative to its 
effect on incentives.) Nonetheless, one does see studies that either implicitly 
or explicitly value utilities of incomes rather than income.14  Interpersonal com- 
parisons apart, diminishing marginal utility implies that people are less than 
twice as well off if their incomes are twice as great. If even just for speculative 
purposes one is willing to consider the possibility that people have equivalent 
“utilometers” all over the world,15  then the obvious implications for how the 
inequality of world utility compares with inequality of world income should 
be considered. (This line of discussion may be skipped by readers who cannot 
abide such out-of-fashion, unscientific notions as these. However, the tempta- 
tion is overwhelming to ask such skeptics if they think that Bill Gates enjoys a 
utility level compared with his subordinates anything like proportional to their 
relative incomes!) 
Diminishing marginal utility of income requires that the relation between 
the utility of  income (U) and income (y) have  a negative second derivative. 
Many different functional forms can be used for the relation-Atkinson  has 
a whole one-parameter family of them-but  a common one because it is so 
simple is of the form U = log y. If the Gini for the world distribution of income 
in the years between 1960 and 1990 is just over 0.50, what would the Gini for 
the world distribution of utility be if utility is taken to be the log of income? 
(Of course, this functional form is entirely arbitrary-at  one end of Atkinson’s 
family-so  the answer to the question has no operational significance.) How 
much less than OSO? The computed values for 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990 
were 0.073,0.076,0.074, and 0.069, respectively. Apart from the absolute size 
of these Ginis, they increased and decreased across the decades essentially like 
the GDP ones.I6 
14. This is done, e.g., in the UN Development Program’s construction of  its Human Develop- 
ment Index (see UNDP 1994). 
15. A point heretofore ignored is whether tastes are the same all over the world. If not, a variety 
of objections can be raised to the ways in which the ICP makes country real incomes comparable. 
Certainly, nothing in this section makes sense in the absence of similar tastes. It is reassuring, 
therefore, to find that, to the limited extent that the ICP data throw light on the issue, they have 
been found to be consistent at least roughly with the similar-tastes hypothesis (see, e.g., chap. 9 
of Kravis, Heston, and Summers [I9821 and a number of studies by Henri Theil). 
16. The authors were surprised at how easy it is to reduce apparently the great disparities in 
income  so ubiquitously  displayed around  the world! However, there is a problem  with base- 
country invariance when dealing with utility functions. PWT estimates of country GDPs are de- 
nominated in international dollars, but all GDP relations, across countries and time, would be the 
same if the algorithm underlying PWT was set to generate estimates denominated in some other 
country’s international currency unit. A similar base-country invariance does not cany over for 
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Intercountry Inequality and Intracountry Inequality 
Intercountry Inequality Compared with Intracountry Inequality. All discussion 
so far has treated each country as though its citizens received the same average 
(per capita or per equivalent adult) income, thus ignoring all intracountry in- 
equality. This leads naturally to an interesting question: Is the inequality of 
average income across countries greater or less than the inequality of income 
within countries?17 For example, is the worldwide inequality greater or less 
than that of the United States and the United Kingdom, India and Indonesia, 
Bolivia and Brazil, etc.?'* Light, if not positive resolution, on the general inter 
versus intra question is shed by  the following simple, informal exercise. We 
arrayed the Gini coefficients of the ninety-four countries included in the admi- 
rable data set of Deininger and Squire (1996). (Where more than one Gini is 
provided for a country-for  different years-the  largest of  them was used.) 
Then the world Ginis (0.539,0.558,0.552, and 0.547) were compared with the 
array to see where world inequality ranks in the country list. Only eighteen 
of the ninety-four country maximum Ginis exceeded the world's  0.539.19  The 
implication of  this is better understood if  the spread in the country Ginis is 
displayed (see table 16.6). 
No obvious viable stochastic model presents itself in table 16.6. The Dei- 
ninger and Squire data set also contains detailed quintile data for the countries. 
Examination of the quintile patterns reveals no single functional form to which 
one can resort in carrying out a decomposition.2o  Fortunately, the fact that the 
World Ginis-for  both GDP and consumption-are  so deep in the tail of the 
country distribution makes plausible without a formal statistical test the judg- 
ment that the intercountry inequality exceeds the intracountry inequality.*l 
Total Inequality: Intercountry Plus Intracountry. Nothing new can be said here 
about world total inequality, but, for completeness, a brief review is presented 
17.  An analytic economist would ask the question more elegantly, in decomposition terms. Un- 
fortunately, an empirical investigation in such terms requires detailed country data that are not 
available. 
18. For the curious, the country Ginis referred to above are United States, 0.38; United King- 
dom, 0.32; India, 0.37; Indonesia, 0.39; Bolivia, 0.42; and Brazil, 0.62. 
19. Here, the intracountry Ginis have been compared with the intercountry Gini for GDP Logi- 
cally, perhaps, they should be compared with the intercountry Gini for consumption. Since the 
latter differed only very slightly from the GDP Ginis (0.529, 0.549, 0.551, and 0.558 for 1960, 
1970, 1980, and 1990, respectively), this shifting of concepts only reinforces the conclusion. 
20. The availability of quintile data in the Deininger and Squire data set makes possible the use 
of  a more transparent inequality index (11)  for making the same kind of inter- vs. intracountry 
comparisons. Consider 11, the ratio of the total income received by persons in the top quintile to 
the total income received by persons in the bottom quintile. (The larger a country's 11, the greater 
its inequality.) As in the case of the world Ginis, the world I1 falls in the upper tail of the frequency 
distribution of country 11's. 
21. Incidentally, it may be remarked that, as expected, the countries represented in the frequency 
distribution with high Ginis all have low incomes. The eighteen countries with Ginis greater than 
0.539 all had low incomes: eight of them had GDPw less than a tenth of that of the United States 
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Table 16.6  The Spread in the Country Ginis 
Gini  Frequency 
.25 <  G 5  .30 
.30 <  G 5  .35 
.40 <  G 5  .45 
.45 <  G 5  .50 
.50 < G 5  .55 
.55 < G 5  .60 
.60 < G 5  .65 
Total 
14 
of the work done on this subject in a previous investigation (Summers, Kravis, 
and Heston 1984). Complete world distributions were synthesized under vari- 
ous conditions to see how the overall Gini (G,)  based on the incomes received 
by  all the individuals in each of the countries of the world exceeded the Gini 
(GMean)  calculated on the assumption that all individuals received the mean 
incomes of their own countries. An artificial world was defined that consisted 
of each of the countries included in the Penn World Table of that time (Mark 
3), and all the country income distributions were assumed to be lognormal. For 
each year considered, each country was assigned as its mean income (p,) the 
GDP per capita estimate in PWT 3 for that year. The procedure for each trial 
then was as follows: (i) a Gini coefficient (G,)  was assigned to each country; 
(ii) each country’s income distribution was synthesized on the basis of  its p, 
and assigned G,;  (iii) on the basis of the synthesized country income distribu- 
tions, the incomes of all the individuals in all the countries were combined into 
a single world distribution, for which G,  was computed; (iv) finally, G, was 
compared with GMean.  By repeating trials involving different assumptions about 
the {Gini: country income} relation, it was possible to flesh out in rough terms 
how much greater G,  would be than GMean  for plausible G,’s. 
Various {G,: p}  relations were considered: (i) G,  = 0.3 and 0.5; (ii) G,  equals 
a rising function of  p; (iii) G,  equals a falling function of I*; and (iv) G,  equals 
a Kuznetzian up-and-down function of  p. The resulting G,’s  based on Ghlea,,’s 
of about 0.5 were between 0.57 and 0.66.22 
Where Are the Rich Countries and Where Are the Poor Ones? 
To make this question interesting, one must have a basis for judging what 
kinds of  where are interesting. The possibilities are endless, starting with a 
usual breakdown, continents, to breakdowns from big/small or mountainous/ 
flat to coldhot or dry/wet. (This sort of  list can go on and on. How about 
old countries/young, or short peopledhall peopled?) If  economic or political 
categories are the focus, the question becomes the mainspring of the endoge- 
nous growth community. 
Here, a very brief reference will be made to the geographic classification of 
countries by  Theil and Seale (1994). They distinguish between countries in 
22. The point of  the original exercise was to start with the actual ~’s  of  particular years and 
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the northern temperate zone, in the southern temperate zone, and in various 
groupings within the world's tropical zone. Contrary to expectation, distance 
from the equator without adjustment is not a very effective explanatory vari- 
able for affluence in simple regressions. However, when the tropical countries 
are appropriately grouped, the influences for which one thinks distance stands 
seem to play a critical role. (It would be interesting to know if  a mechani- 
cal numerical taxonomy algorithm would have led to the same Theil-Seale 
clusters.) 
16.3  The Standard-of-Living  Facts 
16.3.1  Current Material Well-being: SL 
The goods and services that contribute directly to the current material well- 
being of the members of a society are those identified in the national accounts 
as total consumption, which consists of consumption (C: private consumption) 
and government (G:  public consumption). GDP allows for C and GZ3  but also 
takes into account the production of goods meant to help in the production of 
goods in the future. Investment (I),  without doubt a praiseworthy activity, has 
its payoffs-in  fact, material well-being payoffs-but  they are realized in the 
future rather than in the  For many purposes, their potential contribu- 
tion to material well-being should be noted, but not in valuing current material 
well-being. Therefore, the numerator of  the standard-of-living variable, SL, 
excludes I  (and also net foreign investment) from GDP.25 
A not very subtle criticism of GDP is that some of the goods valued in GDP 
do not really generate intrinsic utility. The mildly protesting term regrettable 
necessities is usually used in this situation. The regrettable necessity that plays 
an important role in SL is military expenditures. We  accept as a given that, if 
a society uses a portion of its resources to produce military goods and services, 
it is because, at the appropriate margin, such goods and services have a greater 
value to the society than alternative uses of the resources that went into their 
production. No  judgment is made here, explicit or implicit, about the true value 
to the society of military goods and services. Subtracting military expenditures 
23. Participants in the Hicks-Kuznets debate of the late 1930s would want note taken of the 
Kuznets view that in fact what government buys with its government expenditures are really inter- 
mediate goods and services. By accepting the notion of public consumption, we are simply taking 
the side of the winner of that debate. 
24. Gross domestic product is not really the right measure of material well-being, even apart 
from current well-being considerations. The well-known difficulties associated with estimating 
depreciation make the more appropriate measure, net domestic product, unpopular. In a future 
version of the Penn World Table, estimates (of uncertain quality!) will be provided, based on new 
depreciation rates, for something perhaps called maintainable domestic product. 
25. Some readers may find it helpful to be reminded of an important difference between the 
treatment of government expenditures on final goods and services in the system of national ac- 
counts and in the national accounts of  the United States. In the latter, all public investment is 
retained in the government category, but in the former it is transferred from government to in- 
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from GDP is not motivated by  pacifist notions of  any kind. The point of the 
exclusion is very simple: whatever the yeas or nays about military expendi- 
tures, the military goods and services that they buy are not part of  the goods 
and services that SL is meant to quantify. Cannons, bombers, and submarines 
do not make a direct contribution to current material well-being.26  To summa- 
rize, our definition of SL is 
SL  =  {C + [G - military expenditure~]}/population.2~ 
The first, most obvious question to ask is whether shifting from GDP per 
capita to the SL concept makes a difference in one’s judgment about countries’ 
relative conditions.28  Figure 16.4 and table 16.7, directly analogous with the 
GDP materials already discussed, provide the answer to the question: Yes,  a 
little. In general, the gap between the living standards of very poor developing 
countries and developed ones is a little smaller when measured by SL than by 
GDP,.  A broad generalization is that the bottom 50 percent of the world has 
about 10 percent more of  the world‘s SL output than GDP output. To avoid 
repeating the prolonged GDP discussion but with SL centerstage, the SL dis- 
cussion will concentrate on the relation between SL/GDP,,  (denoted STLIV 
for short) and GDP,.  If  STLIV is negatively associated with GDP,,,  then the 
world distribution of  the goods and services constituting SL will be less un- 
equal than the world distribution of all goods and services; and the opposite 
will be the case if  the association is positive. Without doubt, it is basically 
negative. In regressions run on a variety of  {SL: GDP,,}  data sets (different 
years and different collections of countries), the first derivatives were always 
negative and significantly so. One sample scatter diagram is provided in figure 
16.5 to illustrate this. No sophisticated econometric analysis is required to see 
that the points are higher for very poor countries than for rich ones but that the 
points for middle countries tend to be lower than those of  the rich. In fact, 
regressions containing quadratic terms on the right confirm that there is a little 
(significant) curvature in the best fit to the scatter. 
26. Nothing in the social sciences is ever entirely free of ambiguity: 
1. Suppose that a very poor, homeless, starving person is recruited into the army. The food and 
quarters supplied by  the army surely should be regarded as a contribution to the person’s 
current material well-being and therefore subtracted from the military expenditure total. Un- 
fortunately, the data needed for such an adjustment are not available. 
2. Perhaps, for some people in a country, military expenditures buy peace of mind. Is this part 
of current mater;al well-being? A visit to a psychiatrist’s couch in quest of peace of mind 
surely merits inclusion in SL. We think that, for better and not for worse, the more general 
peace of mind purchased by military expenditures should not be included in SL. 
The saving grace in all this is that military expenditures are generally only a very small propor- 
tion of GDP, and the awkward parts of military expenditures are in most cases not a significant 
proportion of total military expenditure. This places these considerations in that most familiar of 
scientific economic categories, a problem acknowledged and then ignored! 
27. The consumption and government components of SL have been taken from the Penn World 
Table (Mark 5.6). The military expenditure component is from Heston and Aten (1993), which 
supplies references to the original sources of the underlying data. 
28. The difference-cubed principle provides the basis for the ultimate, minimum judgment about 
whether the SL innovation is of any value: A difference that makes no difference is no difference. 496  Robert Summers and Alan Heston 
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Fig. 16.4  Intercountry income inequality: GDP and current material well- 
being, 1970,1980, and 1989 
What is going on here? It is convenient to look in detail at the most recent 
year available, 1989. In that year, STLIV for the United States was 74.9. Then 
the SL of any country with an STLIV greater than 74.9 would be closer to the 
U.S. SL,,  than its GDPp,. would be to the U.S.  GDP,,.  Using GDP,,  as the 
criterion, classify countries into two groups, richer (the twenty richest) and 
poorer (the rest). About four-fifths of  these latter developing countries had 
STLIVs that exceeded 74.9; only a fifth had STLIVs below 74.9. (Could an 
unusually low U.S. STLIV account for this four-to-one split? No. The simple 
unweighted average of the STLIVs of all twenty richest countries is even lower 
than 74.9!) The explanation for this pattern lies in the way the investment and 
military expenditure shares of GDP vary with GDP,.  The investment share 
significantly exceeds the military expenditure share, and, on average, richer Table 16.7  Real Shares of World Current Material Well-being: Standard of 
Living (SL), 1970,1980,1989 
Middle 
Low  Oil  Nonoil  Total  Industrial 
No. of countries  45  14  51  65  24 
1970 
% of population  52.9  4.2  24.1  28.3  18.7 
% of SL  15.1  2.9  22.5  25.4  59.5 
I980 
% of population  54.8  4.4  23.8  28.2  16.9 
% of SL  15.4  4.0  26.0  30.0  54.7 
I989 
% of population  56.1  5.0  23.5  28.6  15.3 
% of SL  18.1  3.3  25.9  29.2  52.7 
1970  1980  1989 
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Fig. 16.5  A scatter diagram of the relation between SL/GDP,, and GDP,, 
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countries devote a larger proportion of  their output to investment than poorer 
ones. The gap-narrowing tendency is present in all the years covered by tables 
16.1 and 16.7. 
The logic here is entirely straightforward. Unfortunately, the facts are some- 
what less so. Everything said about the rich and the poor has been correct. The 
middles are not simply halfway between the two, however. This is not enough 
to make the speculative judgments wrong, but it keeps them from showing up 
strongly. Figure 16.4 shows how the SL Lorenz curves compare with the GDP 
Lorenz curves. They look more alike than might be expected because the 
middle does not toe the same mark as the low. Still, the increment of about 10 
percent in the low’s  share of  the world’s  current material well-being output 
(compared with the low’s share of world GDP) is not at all trivial. 
16.3.2  Current Material Well-being: SL, 
Consider another variable designed to measure current material well-being, 
SL,. This is an estimate of the average spending on consumption (private only) 
of the people of a country in the middle spending quintile of the country. (An 
intuitive way of thinking of this measure is that it is an “expanded median” of 
the consumption spending distribution. It is meant to reflect the same standard 
of living idea, but it concentrates on the spending by people in the middle of 
the spending distribution.) 
The data requirement for estimating SL,  is availability of  quintile data. 
These are available for ninety-six countries but in each case only for a quite 
limited number of years. Trying to construct an  intercountry world distribution 
of SL,  would be hopeless under the circumstances, but perhaps one could get 
an idea of the inequality of that distribution by  examining the relation between 
SL,  and SL. Regressions of the form SL,  = aSL + p generated inconclusive 
results. The estimates of  CY  for 1970 and 1989 data sets were slightly greater 
than one; the estimate for 1980 was very slightly greater than one. There is no 
reason for thinking that the world distribution of SL,  would exhibit either more 
or less inequality than that of SL. 
16.4  Material Well-being and Longevity 
We return to the question of how one might combine a social indicator like 
longevity (L)  with GDPpc  to get a social welfare index that satisfactorily takes 
account of  both  dimensions of  well-being. This topic is raised  here,  even 
though no numbers will appear in this section, because, if a good social welfare 
index can be computed for each country in the world, it would be illuminating 
to examine the world distribution of the combined welfare that the index repre- 
sent~.~~ 
29. In effect, one is looking here for an indifference map that shows the relative preferences for 
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Any simple version of averaging L and GDP,,  clearly cannot be satisfactory. 
The problem is not that the unit of L, years, and the currency unit of GDPpc  are 
incommensurate. A variety of scaling devices can be found to get around that. 
In constructing its Human Development Index, the UN Development Program 
(UNDP) in effect computes a country’s GDPp, position relative to the richest 
and poorest countries in the world in percentage terms, does the same for L, 
and then computes half the sum of the two. (Actually, the UNDP works with 
more than one social indicator.) This would probably be all right if, instead of 
an unweighted average, a properly weighted one was used that takes into ac- 
count the importance-value,  that is-of  extra international dollars of GDP, 
relative to extra years of life. But the UNDP’s approach stops far short of that. 
The trick is to find the right relative values. As indicated above, economists do 
not find this a formidable problem when the two well-being elements are goods 
traded in anything resembling free markets. The relative prices provide a basis 
for the weighting. (Again, why should a Chevrolet be given more weight than 
a pair of shoelaces in the averaging process? It is not that Chevrolets are big 
and shoelaces are small but that marginal utility ratios can be assumed to equal 
price ratios.) 
What can be done about valuing more years of life relative to more GDP,,? 
The economist’s natural way to go about this is to look for a market where in 
effect one can get a dollar reading on the market valuation of an extra year of 
life. There are no malls or mail-order houses that sell extra years of  life- 
although some advertisements seem to offer such a product! However, there is 
a great deal of activity in which agents make economic decisions (not necessar- 
ily spending decisions) that reflect their valuation of an extra year of life. One 
common thread is to observe what workers do when faced with a choice be- 
tween a more risky job with greater pay  and a less risky one with lesser pay. 
Perhaps the very substantial “value-of-a-life” literature now published in both 
mainline and specialized journals can be mined to get, in effect, the needed 
prices for rich countries. With more difficulty, the same might be done for 
developing countries. 
The various pitfalls here are formidable. (i) Clearly, one must not rely on 
values arising from just courtroom damage judgments because these are likely 
to reflect lost earnings; one must stick to the value of living, not capacity to 
earn while living. (ii) One must avoid the double-counting implicit in greater 
longevity being bought with the goods and services of the medical or public 
components of  GDP: count the value of  extra years but not the cost of  the 
components; count the cost of the components but not the value of the extra 
years bought with them (essentially what is down now when longevity is ig- 
relation between health and goods and services, Pritchett and Summers (1997) use (among other 
variables) life expectancy  as a health indicator. They provide a country cross-sectional scatter 
diagram that shows just how correlated longevity and GDP per capita are. Their title, “Wealthier 
is Healthier,” indicates the character of  the relation. If the relation was monotonic with no scatter 
around the fitted curve, there would be no need for sec. 16.4 of this paper. 500  Robert Summers and Alan Heston 
nored); but do not count both. (iii) One should at least try to take account of 
the shape of the mortality table and not simply its mean value. The extra value 
to the Japanese of having a longevity of seventy-nine, three years more than 
that of Americans, would depend on whether the extra three years carry with 
them the certain quality of life enjoyed by  people aged seventy-six, seventy- 
seven, and seventy-eight or the quality associated with other years but with 
different pr~babilities.~~ 
The approach suggested here has already been exploited by  Williamson 
(1984). The notion in the present discussion is primarily a cross-sectional  one, 
but the Williamson valuation of the increase in longevity in Britain in the eigh- 
teenth and nineteenth centuries is a strict time-series counterpart. He supple- 
ments the standard estimates of annual growth of real output with an estimate 
of  the corresponding growth rate of  the value, expressed in output-growth 
terms, of  increased longevity over the period. His approach is equivalent to 
what is being suggested here. However, it is to be expected that all the differ- 
ences between cross-sectional  and time-series analyses come into play to make 
the working out of the details quite different. (For example, Britain was poor 
in a different epoch from the subsequent ones when it was rich; the feedback 
from poor to rich in medical knowledge and technology was a reality but not 
the reverse. In the cross-sectional case, however, the poor countries live in the 
same epochs as the rich with much more interaction likely to be the rule.) 
If one had the necessary data for developing longevity prices in developing 
countries, one could begin to develop estimates of the world distribution of a 
welfare that includes longevity as well as material well-being. In the absence 
of such estimates, one can only speculate on whether the distribution would be 
more or less unequal than the distribution of  material well-being. Would the 
Lorenz curve of the broader measure of welfare lie above or below the Lorenz 
curve of  GDP alone? The fact that longevity is positively correlated with 
GDP,,  and significantly so, does not resolve the question. The degree of tilt of 
LIGDP,  with respect to GDP,  plays a critical role. 
16.5  Conclusion 
The concept well-being for people all over the globe has a number of dimen- 
sions, some of which have been examined empirically in this paper. Material 
well-being flowing from the availability of  goods and services, expressed in 
either current or long-run terms, has been spelled out in some detail in the form 
of the world distribution of income and the distributions for different tiers of 
countries. Nonmaterial well-being, for example, longevity, defined for kinds 
of welfare conditions that do not necessarily flow simply from the availability 
of goods and services, has been discussed from an empirical point of view, but 
with only highly speculative  conclusions.  The problem of quantifying need has 
30. Account should be taken of  the fact that values of  different years of life are not all the same. 501  The World Distribution of Well-being Dissected 
been examined as well to get a basis for determining how far a quantity of 
goods and services goes in enhancing the material well-being of any particular 
population. Most of the empirical conclusions have a time dimension because 
they cover the forty-year period 1960-90. 
Appendix 
Country Assignments to Income Groups 
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Comment  Timothy M. Smeeding 
In this provocative paper, Robert Summers and Alan Heston turn from data 
producers to data users, using their own Penn World Tables (Summers and 
Heston 1991) to generate “the world distribution of well-being dissected.” The 
authors are careful to note that theirs is essentially a measurement exercise in 
the level and trend of intercountry inequality, summarized by various measures 
of inequality as applied to GDP per capita and other related measures of eco- 
nomic well-being. They leave us with few suggestions for further research in 
this arena, although their concluding sections offer some ideas on concocting 
broader measures of  well-being, for instance, those that include longevity as 
well as economic well-being. 
My comments on this work fall into two areas: first, critical comments on 
what has been learned here and how it might be improved and, second, a few 
brief ideas on how to move forward with the issues that are raised in this paper. 
Main Findings and Critique 
Summers and Heston begin by constructing a set of shares of  world output 
(in  constant  purchasing  power  parity-adjusted  dollars)  generated  by  the 
world’s  various nations and trends in shares of  output accruing to various 
groups of nations. The authors adjust for both number of persons (per capita) 
and number of  equivalent adult units (counting those over age fifteen at 1.0 
and those under age fifteen at 0.5). They then show (tables 16.1 and  16.3) 
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trends in both world income shares and world growth rates in income per capita 
(and per adult equivalent) from 1960 to 1990. 
There are three primary results of this exercise. First, income per capita (or 
per equivalent adult) has risen more rapidly in rich (high-income) nations than 
in poor (low-income) nations over this period, although income per capita in 
poor nations has grown as well. Second, the lesser share of output found in the 
rich nations in 1990 (as compared to 1960) was gained mainly by the middle- 
income nations, whose income share increased: low-income nations gained 
little over this period taken as a whole. Third, the per capita and per equivalent 
adult calculations show much the same results, indicating that differences in 
household size and composition as they are deployed in this paper make little 
difference to the results of their analyses. 
The authors are careful to tell us where they have classified the rapidly grow- 
ing nations of the Asian Pacific region, for example, Singapore, Taiwan, Korea, 
and Japan. They are classified by their 1990 status (as rich industrial nations), 
not by their 1960 status (as low- or middle-income nations). While we cannot 
tell how much difference this classification makes to their results, we clearly 
know that the income shares and economic growth rates of the low-income 
(and also the middle-income) nations are biased downward by this treatment. 
What strikes this reader, however, is how different are the period 1980-90 
results shown in tables 16.1 and 16.3 from the 1960-90 results. Over this most 
recent decade, the major gain in share of world output and most rapid growth 
rates are found in the low-income countries. Their share of world output rises 
from 13.8 to  16.6 percent, while the middle- and high-income nations both 
lose output share from 1980 to 1990. The growth rates of GDP per capita (per 
equivalent adult) are 2.9 (2.6) percent in low-income nations over this period, 
as compared to 2.2 (2.0) percent in high-income countries, and an anemic 1.8 
(1.3) percent in the middle-income nations. Moreover, these findings persist 
over and above the biases introduced by classifying the “Asian Tigers” in the 
high-income group. Hence, the  1980-90  pattern is quite different from the 
1960-90  pattern. In fact, it is completely different. 
When these changes are combined with UN projections of low and falling 
fertility rates in the 1990s across a wide spectrum of  nations, including the 
developing world, one would expect to find even more rapid growth rates in 
income per capita (and income per equivalent adult) in the developing world 
for two reasons: fewer children to feed in the developing world and both fewer 
children and more retirees to be supported by fewer workers in the developed 
world (UN Population Division 1996; Wattenberg 1997). Indeed, this is the 
case. Bloom and Brenner (1993) have shown that, over the next two decades, 
the share of  the world‘s  labor force (ages fifteen to sixty-four) in the low- 
income countries will rise from 75 percent (1990) to 90 percent or higher 
(2015). If  world financial markets (or Chilean-style mandatory national de- 
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these nations need to complement their labor power, their growth rates will 
continue to climb. 
The implication is that, with the opening of free trade, the increases in life 
expectancy in most nations, and growing world literacy as evidenced in UN 
Development Program (1997), the low-income countries have begun to expand 
more rapidly than in previous decades. One eagerly awaits the 1995 and subse- 
quent versions of these tables to see if these predictions will be upheld. 
My second comment refers to the per capita versus the per equivalent adult 
comparisons offered by  Summers and Heston. The reason why we  use adult 
equivalence scales and not income per capita alone in micro-data-based studies 
of income inequality is to capture the economies of  scale within households. 
A “per capita” adjustment is just an equivalence scale adjustment that says that 
there are no scale economies within households; that is, four persons need four 
times as much income as do two persons to be as well off. In contrast, a com- 
mon equivalence scale that says that “needs grow only half as fast as incomes” 
when family size expands from one to four would say that the four-person unit 
needs only twice the income of the single person to be as well off (Gottschalk 
and Smeeding 1997). This is, indeed, the type of adjustment that Summers and 
Heston hope to achieve. 
However, their adjustments do not control for this factor! All they have at 
their disposal is the number of  children and the number of  adults (including 
elders) for each nation, and they do crudely control for this difference. How- 
ever, they cannot adjust for the number of children per family, the number of 
elders who live with their children (as opposed to living apart from them), and 
other factors that differ systematically across rich and poor nations. Indeed, 
their adjustments relatively understate true income per equivalent adult in poor 
nations (where family size is much larger) and overstate it in rich nations 
(where families are smaller and most elders have their own households). Given 
what they have, I am not at all surprised by  what they find. A better adjustor 
would be average household size for each nation (or an equivalence adjustment 
pegged to average household size). If these adjustments were made, the results 
would again show greater shares of income and greater rates of growth in de- 
veloping nations as compared to rich nations. 
Intracountry versus Intercountry Inequality 
The authors go on to construct intercountry Gini coefficients (table 16.5). 
These are based on Lorenz curves that treat each nation and its income per 
capita as a single unit. The results are that world inequality has modestly in- 
creased over the period 1960-90  but that rich-nation inequality has fallen by 
more than half  (low-income-country inequality is constant; middle-income- 
nation inequality rises but by less than rich-country inequality falls). The au- 
thors also compare the level of  inequality they find in  1990 to the level of 
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Deininger and Squire (1996) of the World Bank, whose database now contains 
summary estimates of inequality within countries for almost a hundred nations. 
Summers and Heston find that their measures of inequality across nations are 
generally greater than is the inequality they find within these nations using the 
Deininger and Squire data. 
First, regarding the comparative level of inequality, I applaud Deininger and 
Squire’s work. That said, their data need to be scrutinized carefully before they 
are used. Many of their estimates are based on expenditures, not incomes. In 
many  cases, incomes are measured  quite differently: some nations present 
after-tax distributions; others do not. Income produced by households for own 
consumption, a very large fraction of real income in very-low-income nations 
(e.g., in Sub-Saharan Africa and in Latin America), is not measured at all in 
most nations. This adjustment may make a great deal of difference in a nation 
such as China, for instance. While these data are undoubtedly a great improve- 
ment over previous series, one should not ignore the warning signs and guide- 
posts declared by the data set creators themselves (Deininger and Squire 1996). 
Second, Summers and Heston find a trend toward greater equality among 
the rich nations of the world. Of course, these comparisons are hazardous, and 
Summers and Heston tend to understate the hazards on several grounds. Most 
important (and well recognized by the authors) is that their estimates ignore 
intracountry inequality. In fact, the degree of income inequality within twenty 
of their twenty-four rich countries can be studied directly using both national 
data and the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) micro data for each nation. 
When we look into the LIS data set, we find (1) that income inequality has 
increased, not declined, over the past twenty to thirty years within most nations 
(Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997, 1998) and (2)  that the level of inequality (as 
measured by  the Gini around  1990) for these nations ranges from roughly 
0.225 to 0.360, with none below 0.225. Summers and Heston find an industrial 
or rich-nation intercountry Gini of 0.090 in 1990 and a drop in the rich-country 
Gini from 0.141 in 1970 to 0.090 in 1990. What these comparisons indicate is 
that intercountry measures of  the level and trend in overall world inequality 
based on some single indicator of average well-being for each nation cannot 
be compared to intracountry levels and trends in inequality. 
Moreover, if we compare real incomes at various percentiles of the distribu- 
tion (not just at the average or median), we find that country rankings can shift 
tremendously. For instance, in a sample of sixteen of these twenty-four nations, 
the United States has the highest real disposable income per equivalent adult 
(and also the highest real income per capita) at the median of the distribution. 
Yet, at the bottom of the distribution, the person at the tenth percentile in the 
United States “enjoys” a lower real income than do fourteen of  the sixteen 
other countries’ residents at these income levels. The real living standards of 
the “average” person in each nation may, therefore, be quite different from the 
real living standards of persons at the top and bottom of each income distribu- 
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that counts real household income per equivalent adult (in purchasing power- 
adjusted dollars) for each person in each nation, all in the same distribution. 
While such a comparison is possible for the twenty richest nations on earth 
using the LIS data, so far no one has made the calculation. 
Finally, I join Summers and Heston in recognizing that better micro data 
estimates of the size distribution of real income for the remaining hundred-odd 
nations of  the world are sorely needed. Deininger and Squire have  made a 
beginning at collecting comparable household income micro data sets. What 
is needed is for the world‘s household income data collectors to pay  greater 
attention to the work of  the Canberra Group, a collection of twenty or more 
national central statistical offices and international organizations (e.g., LIS, 
OECD) that are working to develop practical guidelines for producing compa- 
rable income distribution estimates from high-quality surveys (Australian Bu- 
reau of Statistics 1997).  The work of the Canberra Group is to provide the raw 
data that Summers and Heston (and Deininger and Squire) need as input to 
their work. 
Future Work 
Every study of world inequality such as this must be taken in the context of 
what has gone before and what will come after. In this light, this paper is a 
step forward, albeit a modest one. Greater use of micro data is within our grasp 
for the rich nations of the world and for many of the developing ones as well. 
We  should use these data to their fullest extent and also support such bodies 
as the Canberra Group, which continues to produce better, more comparable 
national and international income distribution data. 
Studies of the Summers and Heston variety still have real value in under- 
standing how various nations’ economic well-being and rates of  growth are 
related to their shares of world output. Hence, Summers and Heston’s tables 
16.1 and  16.3 should be updated regularly to allow us to investigate newly 
emerging trends such as the growth of  real income and living standards in 
poor nations. 
Moving to broader measures of well-being, the United Nations has begun to 
construct a human poverty index to go with its human development index so 
that we can push beyond overall average income per capita, overall literacy, 
and mortality to look at how each of these components of well-being is chang- 
ing within developed and developing countries. Such work demands greater 
attention and scrutiny. 
In order to go further with international comparisons of real income distribu- 
tions, one also needs to pay  greater attention to intercountry differences in 
purchasing power parities that have emerged from different estimates made by 
the World Bank, the OECD, and other bodies. The Penn World Tables are no 
longer the only source of purchasing power parities extant, producing confu- 
sion as to which set is appropriate. Finally, the use of GDP-based purchasing 
power parities to adjust individual and household-based disposable after-tax- 508  Robert Summers and Alan Heston 
and-transfer incomes is in its infancy. Prices and market baskets vary within 
nations between rich and poor and across nations as well. Many nations tax 
finance goods and services such as education and health care more heavily than 
their consumer finance in other nations. Hence, applying micro data-based 
purchasing power parities to micro data-based  measures of  disposal incomes 
may be misleading. Research on this topic should be near the top of the list of 
important contributions to world real income distribution measurement. 
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